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I. INTRODUCTION 
Just north of the historic Route 66 town of Flagstaff, Arizona sit the San Francisco Peaks, beautiful 
spectacles of nature and the center of prolonged, contentious court battles.  On the one side is an argument for 
economic development with the desired expansion of the Arizona Snowbowl, a relatively small ski resort operated 
under a special use permit1 from the United States Forest Service.  The ski resort has been a popular destination 
since the late 1930’s for both tourists and southern Arizona residents trying to escape the summer heat of the desert 
southwest or in search of climate change and skiing in the winter.  On the other side is an argument by numerous 
native tribes who hold the Peaks sacred and desire that they remain as untouched and pristine as possible.  Members 
of these tribes have been making spiritual treks to the Peaks for hundreds of years.  The legal dispute between the 
two sides first appeared in federal courts in the 1970’s as a First Amendment Free Exercise case and a recent 
decision by the United States Forest Service to allow the Snowbowl to expand in size and to use reclaimed water to 
make snow recently has reignited the dispute, based this time in federal statutes instead of the Constitution.   
On December 11, 2007, lawyers appeared before an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to 
debate the legality of the current special use permit issued by the United States Forest Service, particularly as it 
relates to making snow from reclaimed water.  The en banc hearing followed a Ninth Circuit panel decision that the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the Forest Service from allowing Snowbowl to 
expand operations and improve fiscal viability through snowmaking with reclaimed water.  The environmental, 
social, political and legal issues and conflicts are clear and important – federal land management, economic 
development, religious freedom and an utter lack of clarity with regard to the standards to be used and the judicial 
interpretations to be given to RFRA.  This paper briefly reviews the history of religious freedom law, looks to the 
current dispute at the Arizona Snowbowl for demonstration of the complexity of the issues and addresses the actions 
that the Supreme Court can and should take when the inevitable writ of certiorari is filed.  Specifically, this paper 
advocates that the Court should use this case to address two issues: first, the increasing trend over time for Congress 
and other governmental bodies to disregard the limitations placed on them by the Constitution in hopes that 
challenges won’t occur or that courts will find the rationale and, second, the movement of religion from a key civil 
liberty as set forth in the First Amendment to a statutory issue of seemingly lower value.   
 
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LAW   
A. Early Free Exercise Jurisprudence    
 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall pass no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . .”2    From the beginning, free exercise of 
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1 According to the United Forest Service, there are over 68,000 special use permits currently active across the nation 
as of the writing of this article (including issued, approved and pending signature).  Of these, 130 are for winter 
recreation resorts, 293 for other resorts, 7 for golf courses, 68 for parks and playgrounds, 15 for water treatment 
plants, 6 for restaurants, 8 for service stations, 85 for ski –related activities such as snow play areas, 16 for Native 
American Traditional Religious Activity, 77 for churches, over 14,000 for recreational residences, 301 for privately 
held residences, 300 for motion picture and TV location, and 1300 for individual recreation events (with another 
1400 recreation event permits terminated, revoked or closed).  Letter from James D. Bedwell, Director, Recreation 
and Heritage Resources, United States Forest Service to author (Oct. 23, 2007) (on file with author).  It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to analyze how many of these permits are on land that is considered sacred by any particular 
group, but based on the number of special use permits, one can surmise that there are a number of industries 
watching this case closely. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.   
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religion was not an unlimited license to behave in any way one saw fit.3  In its first constitutional Free Exercise case 
that addressed the Amendment, the Supreme Court upheld anti-polygamy laws and noted that “Congress was 
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of 
social duties or subversive of good order.”4  In 1940, the Court affirmed that beliefs were to be free of regulation, 
and that some actions, but not all, also were not to be regulated and it overturned the conviction of several Jehovah’s 
Witnesses for religious solicitation.5  These early cases did not give any guidance to the extent of government 
regulation allowed, and did not enunciate a clear test to determine the constitutionality of a regulation of religious 
behavior.6  That type of guidance did not come about until 1963 when the Supreme Court enunciated the compelling 
interest test for Free Exercise cases in the famous Sherbert v. Verner.7 
 
B. The Rise of the Compelling Interest Test   
 In Sherbert v. Verner,8the Supreme Court held that South Carolina illegally withheld unemployment 
compensation from a Seventh Day Adventist who was fired (and could not find other work) because she would not 
work on Saturday.9  The fired employee believed that Saturday was her Sabbath or day of rest.10  The Court 
determined that the South Carolina regulation was unconstitutional by using the “compelling interest test:” in order 
to burden the religion of the plaintiff, the state action must be the least burdensome way to achieve a compelling 
state interest.11 
Nearly ten years later, the Court invalidated a state compulsory school attendance law requiring attendance 
until the age of 16.12  In Yoder v. Wisconsin, Amish children challenged the state law because of their sincerely held 
religious belief that education in high school or beyond could endanger their salvation.13  The court noted that, even 
though the government may have the jurisdiction to control education, a “regulation neutral on its face may, in its 
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the 
free exercise of religion.”14  The court then used the compelling interest test from Sherbert to determine that there 
was no sufficient justification for compulsory education as applied to the Amish.15  In doing so, the Court rejected 
the state’s interests in preparing students for participation in the political system, protecting children from ignorance 
and from unscrupulous employers who may violate the child labor laws if children are readily available instead of in 
school.16   
After Sherbert and Yoder, it seemed that under the compelling interest test, the government had a 
substantial task in proving that its regulations were necessary and narrowly tailored to satisfy compelling needs – a 
standard that was not impossible, but that favored religious freedom.  During the next 20 years, however, the Court 
found many compelling interests to support government action that burdened religion and found many exceptions to 
                                                 
3 For a comprehensive review of religion clause cases and jurisprudence, see Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms 
of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 7 (1993). 
4 Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).  The Court did address a religious case in 1847, but did not mention the 
Free Exercise Clause at all.  Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588 (1845).  See Michael W. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. LAW REV. 1409 
(1990) (containing a detailed history of the origins of the Free Exercise Clause).   
5 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). 
6 See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward A Unified Theory of First Amendment 
Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV 9, 13 (2001).    One scholar has argued that 
the analysis in the early Free Exercise cases was a coherent jurisdictional analysis – that the amendment put certain 
things outside the jurisdiction of the government, but not others.  Herbert W. Titus, The Free Exercise Clause: Past, 
Present and Future, 6 REGENT U. LAW REV. 7 (1995).   
7 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
8 Id.   
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 402, n. 1. 
11 Id. at 403. 
12 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
13 406 U.S. at 209. 
14 Id. at 220 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).   
15 406 U.S. at 234. 
16 Id. at 222-229. 
3 
 
the standard analysis.17  These interests and exceptions included the maintenance of the comprehensive Social 
Security system,18 military regulations,19 and prison regulations.20 
 
C. A Failed Attempt to Clarify Free Exercise Jurisprudence:  Employment Division. v. Smith  
 In 1990, the Supreme Court moved away from the compelling interest test in the case entitled Employment 
Division v. Smith21.  In Smith, two men were denied unemployment benefits after being terminated by a drug 
rehabilitation center for using peyote, a controlled substance with a sacramental purpose in some Native American 
religions.22  An Oregon statute forbad the use of peyote without exception for religious purposes.23  Hearkening to 
the Reynolds opinion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the state may not regulate religious beliefs and further 
noted that it would seem to violate the free exercise provisions of the First Amendment for the state to regulate 
conduct specifically for religious reasons or limited to religious circumstances.24  Because the Oregon statute did not 
forbid the use of peyote only when used in a religious ceremony, but instead banned the use of peyote as a 
controlled substance regardless of the reasons for use, the Court held that the prohibition was constitutional.25  
Justice Scalia stated that when “prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is . . . merely the incidental effect of a 
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”26  In stating such, 
the Court rejected the proposition that the compelling interest test of Sherbert and Yoder applies to laws of general 
applicability.27  The Court limited the compelling interest test to unemployment compensation rules (as opposed to 
criminal law which was the underlying question in this case).28  Justice Scalia noted a long line of free exercise cases 
where the test was not applied to facially neutral government action with an incidental burden to religion.29   
 Justice O’Connor agreed with the result of the case, but strongly disagreed with the Court’s interpretation 
of First Amendment jurisprudence, noting that the First Amendment “does not distinguish between laws that are 
generally applicable and laws that target particular religious practices.”30  In her analysis of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, joined by three other justices, she noted that the Court historically chose not to apply strict scrutiny 
only in very narrow fields where the government traditionally has great leeway (such as military and prison 
regulations).31  Justice O’Connor noted that the limits given by the majority were frivolous as “few States would be 
so naïve as to enact a law directly prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such.”32  According to Justice 
O’Connor, to allow the compelling interest test to be used for evaluating the denial of unemployment benefits, but 
not to use the same test to evaluate a statute that imposes criminal sanctions is illogical.33  The proper and 
constitutional analysis would be to apply the test even when it is generally agreed that the state has a compelling 
interest, as is the case with criminal prohibitions.34  Because of her belief that the compelling interest test should 
                                                 
17 Titus, supra note 6 at 19-22.   
18 U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
19 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,  (1986) (stating that the “review of military regulations challenged on First 
Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for 
civilian society.”).  
20 O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (giving great deference to the penal system similar to that given the 
military).   
21 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
22 Id. at 874.   
23 Id. at 876. 
24 Id. at 877 (noting that it is likely true, but that no Supreme Court decision has specifically stated such).  See supra 
note 4 and accompanying text for more on the Reynolds case. 
25 494 U.S. at 882. 
26 Id. at 878.    
27 Id.  at 883. 
28 Id. at 880. 
29 Id. at 880, 883-4 (Included in the list were prohibitions on polygamy and child labor, validity of Sunday closure 
laws, the military draft and the requirements to have a Social Security number, government logging and road 
building, military dress regulations and prisoner work requirements.) 
30 Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
31 494 U.S. at 900-1 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
32 Id. at 894. 
33 Id. at 898. 
34 Id. at 899.   
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have been applied, Justice O’Connor applied the test and determined that the compelling interest in regulating 
controlled substances, combined with the lack of exception for peyote use, was sufficient for the law to be 
constitutional.35   
 The three justices who joined Justice O’Connor’s analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence also went on 
to apply the compelling interest test but determined that the interests of the state were not sufficient.36  Justice 
Blackmun pointed to the fact that Oregon does not actively prosecute religious users of peyote for drug crimes and 
thus the State could not have a truly compelling interest in a universal prohibition of that drug.37  Justice Blackmun 
and those who joined him would have held the prohibition was a violation of the First Amendment and would have 
found that Oregon must pay the unemployment benefits.  
 The decision that the compelling interest test does not apply to laws of general applicability not only 
created a stirring dissent and concurrence, but also struck a nerve with the legislative branch sparking immediate, 
though slow moving action. 
 
D. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
 Almost immediately after the Smith decision, Congress began discussions of legislation to restore the prior 
First Amendment jurisprudence as set forth by Justice O’Connor in Smith.38  Bills were introduced in 1991 and 1992 
before RFRA finally passed in 1993.39  The stated purpose of RFRA was to “restore the compelling interest test as 
set forth in Sherbert and Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is 
substantially burdened.”40  
 The key provision of RFRA states that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise 
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided.”41  The statute then 
provides that the government may create a substantial burden if there is a compelling governmental interest and the 
burden is a result of the least restrictive means to further that interest.42  Such language was derived from Sherbert 
and Yoder, both mentioned specifically in the statute.  In Sherbert, the Court stated that, if the regulation in question 
was to be upheld it would be, in part, “because any incidental burden on the free exercise” of religion is justified by 
a compelling government interest.43  Similarly in Yoder, the court noted that a facially neutral regulation may violate 
the constitution “if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”44 
 After the passage of the RFRA, commentators and scholars argued at great length whether the statute was 
constitutional.  Opponents to RFRA argued that its passage violated the principles of separation of powers and 
federalism and was beyond any authority of Congress.45  Proponents argued that RFRA was not a constitutionally 
based law as applied to the federal government, but was instead a form of self-regulation, committing the 
government to not burden religion in the future.46  In 1997, in the City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court 
declared that RFRA was not constitutional as to state and local governments, but made no comment on its 
constitutionality regarding the federal government.47   
                                                 
35 Id. at 906. 
36 494 U.S. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan and 
the dissent.   
37 Id. at 911.   
38 S. REP. 103-111 at 2 (1993). 
39 Id.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb – 2000bb-4 for the final RFRA as amended in 2000.   
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000).   
41 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2000). 
42 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2000).   
43 374 U.S. at 403.   
44 406 U.S. at 220.   
45 See, e.g., Eugene Gressman and Angela Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 65 (1996) (arguing that RFRA violates separation of powers principles); and Christopher Eisgruber and 
Lawrence G. Sagar, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994) 
(arguing that RFRA is unconstitutional for various reasons).   
46 See, e.g., Gregory Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without 
Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903 (2001).   
47 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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 Following Flores, Congress spent three years in debate and then attempted to overturn the Court’s decision 
by passing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).48  RLUIPA imposes the compelling 
interest test directly to government regulations related to land use decisions49 or institutionalized persons.50  As part 
of the enactment of RLUIPA, the Congress amended RFRA to eliminate the terms or sections deemed 
unconstitutional in Flores and to refer to RLUIPA for the definition of “exercise of religion”51 to include “any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”52  RLUIPA was held 
constitutional by the Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson, but Justice Ginsburg noted in a footnote that the Supreme Court 
has not addressed the constitutionality of RFRA.53    
 In its most recent RFRA case, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, the Supreme 
Court implicitly upheld RFRA as constitutional when it upheld a preliminary injunction granted in light of RFRA to 
prevent the enforcement of a controlled substance law.54  Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court noted that 
there is no “cause to pretend that the task assigned by Congress to the courts under RFRA is an easy one,” implying 
that the task is a legitimate task and that the legislation is valid.55  Even so, the Court has yet to directly declare 
constitutionality and the current dispute regarding the Arizona Snowbowl is evidence of the confusion that RFRA, 
RLUIPA and the First Amendment have created with regard to religion.   
 
III. THE SNOWMAKING DISPUTE 
A. A History of the Peaks 
The San Francisco Peaks, or just The Peaks as residents of northern Arizona call them, rise majestically 
over 12,000 feet in to the clear blue southwest skies.56  The Peaks consist of several peaks arranged in a horseshoe 
pattern to the north of Flagstaff and are part of a large volcanic field on the southern edge of the Colorado Plateau.57  
The Peaks are a significant source of groundwater (though not a tremendous source of runoff) for northern 
Arizona.58 
The Arizona Snowbowl Ski Resort operates on federal land in the San Francisco Peaks under a special use 
permit granted by the United States Forest Service.59  It is just minutes away from the historic Route 66 in Flagstaff, 
Arizona, approximately two hours from the saguaro cacti and sandy deserts of Phoenix, one hour away from the red 
rocks of Sedona and 1.5 hours from the grandeur of the Grand Canyon.  The ski resort resides on approximately one 
percent of the Peaks.60   
People have been skiing at Snowbowl since 1937 when the Forest Service first built a road and a ski 
lodge.61  Over time, the ski resort was sold to private owners, and was upgraded and modified to meet the demands 
of modern skiers.  During the 1950s and 1960s, a new lodge was built and ski lifts were added.62  In 1979, the 
owners of Snowbowl submitted a master plan for the development of the ski resort, including new parking, another 
                                                 
48 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc – 2000cc-5 (2000).  See Sara Smolik, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was It a 
Waste?, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723, 724 (2005) (giving a brief legislative history of RLUIPA).  
49 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(1) (2000). 
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a) (2000). 
51 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(4) (2000).   
52 42.U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000). 
53 544 U.S. 709 at n.1 (2005).  In Cutter, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) as it applied to prisoners.  
54 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
55 Id. at 439. 
56 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2007) (Navajo Nation II) (noting that 
Humphrey’s Peak is Arizona’s highest point at 12,633 feet). 
57 John A Taylor, Hydrothermal Regimes of the San Francisco Peaks Volcanic Field and The Southern Verde 
Valley, North-Central Arizona (May 1997) (unpublished MS Thesis, Northern Arizona University) (on file with 
Cline Library, Northern Arizona University).    
58 Id. at page 17. 
59 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F.Supp.2d 866, 870 (D.Ariz. 2006), (Navajo Nation I).   
60 Id. at 883. 
61 Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert den. 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).   
62 708 F. 2d 735.   
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new lodge, 120 acres of new ski runs and a number of new ski lifts.63  At that time, the Forest Service completed an 
environmental impact study according to the National Environmental Protection Act, evaluated a number of 
different proposals for development, sought input from numerous constituencies (including the Navajo and Hopi 
tribes) and issued a final environmental impact statement.  That statement gave the Snowbowl owners the 
permission to clear fifty acres of new runs, build a new lodge, improve road access and construct three new lifts.64  
Many native tribes filed an unsuccessful lawsuit alleging violations of the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment as well as a number of federal statutes.65   
In 2002, new owners of Snowbowl decided to complete all of the upgrades approved in the 1979 
environmental impact statement and also to submit a proposal to implement snowmaking using reclaimed water and 
to add a snow play area.66  Two and a half years later, after periods of public comment and participation, 
consultation with the tribes, scientific analysis and other assessment, the Forest Service completed its environmental 
impact statement and approved the proposal.67  The approval did not expand the acreage available for skiing beyond 
the 1979 EIS, but did allow for the additional developments requested.68  Again, many of the northern Arizona 
native tribes filed a lawsuit to prevent expansion and development.69 
Today, the Snowbowl hosts thirty-two runs and has four ski lifts.70    Recent statistics show that the 
Snowbowl was open for a low of four days in 2001-02 with just under 3000 skiers to a high of 139 days in 2004-05 
with over 191,000 skiers purchasing tickets.71  Even so, information on the impact of the snowmaking on the 
northern Arizona economy is unclear.  The Flagstaff Chamber of Commerce supports snowmaking, arguing that the 
economy of the town would be vastly improved if Snowbowl were able to be open more regularly during the 
winter.72  The argument is countered by the Flagstaff Convention and Visitors Bureau which released statistics 
showing that revenue from lodging, restaurant and bar sales grew significantly in 2005-2007 when the Snowbowl 
had few to no days open compared to 2004-05 when Snowbowl had one of its best seasons.73 
 
B. The Religious Significance of the Peaks 
Northern Arizona is home to a large number of Native American tribes, including the Navajo, the Hopi, the 
Havasupai, the Hualapai, the Yavapai-Apache, and the White Mountain Apache.74  Each of these tribes considers the 
Peaks significant to, if not central to, their religious beliefs and practices.75  Members of these tribes do not casually 
visit the Peaks; they make pilgrimages to the Peaks which require sacrifice and preparation for the members to be 
spiritually prepared to physically enter the sacred ground.76  Each tribe holds the Peaks in reverence and awe, but for 
different reasons and in different ways.  The focus of the legal battles, and of this section of this paper, will be the 
significance of the Peaks to four tribes: the Hopi, the Navajo, the Havasupai and the Hualapai.   
The Hopi view the Peaks as the home of the spiritual beings who act as intermediaries between humans and 
the gods (Katsinam or Kachinas). 77  The Peaks are the source of knowledge and instruction, as well as the heaven 
where spirits reside after death.78  According to court records, the Hopi have been journeying to the Peaks for over 
450 years.79  The Hopi direct their daily prayers toward the Peaks.80  In addition, the Hopi collect water and tree 
branches from the Peaks for their religious ceremonies.81 
                                                 
63 Id. at 738. 
64 Id.  The 1979 decision was the impetus for the first lawsuit by the tribes against the Forest Service and the 
Snowbowl.  See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text for more discussion on the 1979 case.   
65 See infra text accompanying notes 89-102.  
66 Navajo Nation I at 870. 
67 Id. at 870-871. 
68 Id. at note 3.   
69 See infra Part III.D. for a discussion of the current litigation.  
70 See http://www.arizonasnowbowl.com/pdfs/trail_map.pdf  (last viewed on April 26, 2007). 
71 Navajo Nation II at 1030. 
72 J. Ferguson, Local Businesses Leaders Lament Lost Opportunity, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, March 13, 2007, at A-1. 
73 Navajo Nation II at 1030.  
74  Id. at 1029. 
75 Id. at 1034. 
76 Id.   
77 Id.   
78 Navajo Nation II, at 1034. 
79 Id.  
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The Navajo have different, but equally strong beliefs about the Peaks.  The Navajo believe that the Peaks 
are the source of life, to which daily prayers and songs are directed.82  The Navajo healers collect herbs, stones and 
soil from the Peaks for inclusion in their medicine bundles, which are “conduits for prayers.”83  Other medicines 
used to heal Navajos are derived from plants that are collected from the Peaks.84  In addition to their reverence of the 
Peaks as a religious center, the Navajo religion gives responsibility to humans to be the caretakers of the earth.85   
The Hualapai and Havasupai also hold the Peaks sacred.86  The Peaks are the focus of the creation story for 
both tribes, which also shared a historic belief that the world was flat and that the Peaks were at the center of the 
world.87  They believe that the plants and water from the Peaks have special healing power.88   
 It is because of the strong religious convictions of the tribes and the importance of the Peaks in their 
ceremonies that the tribes have been willing to fight development or expansion on the Peaks.   
 
C. The First Battle: Wilson v. Block 
The first legal battle between the native peoples and the United States government with regard to the Peaks 
resulted from the 1979 environmental impact statement, when the Forest Service approved expanding the 
development at Snowbowl.89  In Wilson v. Block, a three judge panel at the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit (which included now Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) affirmed the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment for the U. S. Forest Service, allowing development at the Snowbowl.90   Among other 
laws, the Court held that the decision of the Forest Service did not violate the tribes’ free exercise of religion under 
the First Amendment.91   
In 1980, as was discussed above, courts were using the compelling interest test of Sherber and Yoder to 
decide First Amendment claims.92  Thus, the tribes had to show that the government’s actions constituted a burden 
on their religion which was not advancing a compelling government interest in the least restrictive way.  The D.C. 
Circuit Court never got to the heart of the compelling interest test because the judges held that the tribes failed to 
show a burden on their religions.  The tribes’ religions themselves were not in question: both the trial judge and the 
appellate panel acknowledged the sincerity of the religious beliefs of the tribes and the significance of the Peaks in 
their spirituality.93  In addition, the judges all acknowledged the sincere belief that the tribes have a duty to the gods 
to protect the mountains and prevent unnatural change or development and that development had already disturbed 
members of the tribes.94  Even so, because the Snowbowl ski resort constituted only a small percentage95 of the 
Peaks and the tribes continued to have access to other areas of the Peaks, the panel determined that the tribal 
religions in question were not burdened.96  The panel stated that the increased development of such a small area did 
                                                                                                                                                             
80 Id.   
81 Id. 1035.  
82 Id.   
83 Navajo Nation II, at 1035.  
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1036. 
86Id. at 1036-8. 
87 Id.   
88 Navajo Nation II at 1036-8.  
89 Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert den. 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).  The tribes alleged violations of 
their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, fiduciary 
duties that the government owed the tribes, the Endangered Species Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, the 
Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act, the Wilderness Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative 
Procedure Act and two federal statutes regulating private use of federal lands.   
90 708 F. 2d at 760. 
91 Id. at 739.  See supra text accompanying notes 63-64 for a description of the environmental impact statement.   
92 See Part II. B. for a discussion of the compelling interest test. 
93 708 F. 2d at 740.  See also Part III.B. for more information on the beliefs of the tribes.   
94  708 F. 2d at 740.     
95 Id. at 744 (noting that 777 of 75,000 acres (approximately 1%) were in use as the resort at the time of the Wilson 
opinion.).  
96 Id. at 745. 
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not directly limit the tribes’ access to the Peaks and did not directly interfere with the tribes’ abilities to perform 
ceremonies or collect ceremonial objects.97   
The panel was not persuaded by the tribes’ attempt to read the Sherbert test as a broad statement about 
religious burdens.98  Instead, the panel stated that Sherbert merely held that the government could not force someone 
to choose between religious beliefs and a government benefit (in that case unemployment benefits conditioned upon 
the ability to work on the Sabbath).99  With regard to the argument that development of the Peaks would harm the 
future of tribal religions because youth would not believe that the Peaks are a sacred location when developed, the 
panel stated that “many government actions may offend religious believers, and may cast doubt upon the veracity of 
religious beliefs, but unless such actions penalize faith, they do not burden religion.”100 
Because the panel failed to find a burden to the religions of the tribe, it declined to determine if the 
development of the ski resort was a compelling interest or whether the approved development was the least 
restrictive means to achieve that interest.101   The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, leaving the 
appellate court’s decision to stand and leaving the Snowbowl with permission to develop.102 
 
D. The Current Legal Battle:  Navajo Nation v. US Forest Service 
1.  The District Court Opinion 
In 2002, almost 20 years after the Wilson decision,103 new owners of Snowbowl decided to complete all of 
the upgrades approved in the 1979 environmental impact statement and allowed by the Wilson decision.104    New 
controversy sparked when the owners also submitted a proposal to implement snowmaking using reclaimed water 
and to add a snowplay area.105  As it did in the Wilson case, the Forest Service completed the process and issued an 
environmental impact statement which did not expand the acreage available for skiing beyond the statements 
litigated in Wilson, but did allow for the additional developments requested.106   
Shortly after the Forest Service issued its final ruling on the development, the Navajo Nation and the Sierra 
Club filed a lawsuit.107  As in the Wilson case, the plaintiffs claimed that the Forest Service violated a host of 
statutes as well as its trust responsibility to the tribes.  Several of the complaints exactly mirrored the complaints 
brought in Wilson:  violations of the National Environmental Protection Act, the national Historic Preservation Act, 
and the Endangered Species Act.108  New allegations included violations of the Grand Canyon National Park 
Enlargement Act, the National Forest Management Act and, because of the Smith decision and its fallout, the 
RFRA.109   
After analyzing the many claims in this litigation, the court granted summary judgment for the Forest 
Service and the owners of the Snowbowl on all claims except the RFRA claim.110  As to that claim, the court held an 
                                                 
97 Id. at 744.   
98  Id. at 741.   
99 708 F. 2d at 741.   
100  Id. 
101 Id. at 745. 
102 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).  Many of the activities in the current suit between the tribes and the Snowbowl were 
approved under this 1979 Environmental Impact Statement.  See, Navajo Nation I at 870, n.2. 
103 See Part III.C. for a discussion of Wilson.   
104 Navajo Nation I at 870. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at note 3.   
107 By the time the case was set for trial, numerous plaintiffs were added and separate complaints were consolidated 
so that the final list of plaintiffs included the Navajo Tribe, the Sierra Club, the White Mountain Apache Tribe, the 
Yavapai-Apache Tribe, the Center for Biological Diversity, the Flagstaff Activist Network, the Hopi Tribe, the 
Hualapai Tribe, the Havasupai Tribe and a number of individual members of those tribes.  See Navajo Nation I at n. 
1.   
108 Navajo Nation I at 871. See n. 88 for details of the complaints alleged in Wilson v. Block.   
109 Navajo Nation I at 871.   
110 With regard to the National Environmental Protection Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and the 
National Forest Management Act the court rejected plaintiffs allegations of procedural violations.  Navajo Nation I 
at 873-81.  The Court granted summary judgment for claims under the Grand Canyon Enlargement Act and the 
Endangered Species Act for lack of jurisdiction and inapplicability of the statutes. Id. at 881-2.  Finally, the court 
granted summary judgment with regard to allegations of trust violation determining that the trust obligations were 
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eleven-day bench trial and enunciated 222 findings of fact.111   The District Court opinion reads very much like the 
Wilson decision.  In a few brief paragraphs, Judge Rosenblatt notes that the RFRA imposes the compelling interest 
test as it existed prior to the Smith case and that lack of definition in RFRA should be clarified using pre-Smith free 
exercise case law.112  Citing Wilson, the Court then found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the 
developments and approved upgrades would burden their religion.113  Because the burdens described by the 
Plaintiffs were similar to those asserted in Wilson, the result also was the same.114  The court noted that only two 
potential developments were different from the Wilson approved developments:  snowmaking with the reclaimed 
water and the development of a proposed snowplay facility.115  The court found that these two additions did not 
change the result as determined by the panel in Wilson – that the tribes still have access to the Peaks for ceremonies 
and collection of ceremonial objects and so no burden exists.116 
Unlike the panel in Wilson, Judge Rosenblatt continued in his opinion to address the “compelling interest” 
and the “least restrictive means” provisions of the RFRA test to ensure that his rationale was clear to the appellate 
courts in what would be an inevitable appeal.117  Judge Rosenblatt cited three compelling interests to support the 
decision by the Forest Service:  first, the mandate by federal law that the Forest Service hold federal lands for 
multiple uses; second, that the upgrades will ensure the safety of skiers and others at the resort; and third, a refusal to 
allow the upgrades would potentially violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.118 
In determining whether the approved upgrades were the least restrictive means to achieve those compelling 
interests, the court gave deference to the thorough investigation of alternatives completed by the Forest Service in 
addition to an inability of the tribes to proffer any means that were less restrictive than the Forest Service’s approved 
means.119  Judge Rosenblatt found for the defendants on the RFRA claim, allowing the owners of the Snowbowl to 
improve operations through, among other things, the making of snow using reclaimed water.  This decision shortly 
was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.    
 2.  The Ninth Circuit Panel Opinion 
Just a year after the District Court opinion was issued, the Ninth Circuit panel issued its opinion in the 
appeal.120  The court affirmed the District Court on all counts, except one claim under the National Environmental 
Protection Act and the RFRA claim related to snow making.121   
 The more publicly debated and controversial topic in the opinion was the discussion of RFRA.  In 
analyzing whether the trial court decided correctly for the Forest Service on the RFRA claim, the circuit court easily 
found that significant religious exercises are related to the Peaks122 and noted that the introduction of reclaimed 
water to the snow areas would burden the tribes’ religions in two ways:  first, specific items would be contaminated 
and therefore rendered useless in specific religious exercises, and second, the Peaks generally would be rendered 
contaminated and therefore unholy.123  The court looked to the record and highlighted the testimony of Navajo and 
                                                                                                                                                             
satisfied when the Forest Service complied with the requirements of the general statutes mentioned above.  Id. at 
882. 
111 Navajo Nation I at 882-903.   
112 Id. at 903.  
113 Id. at 906. 
114 Id. at 905. 
115 Id. at 886. 
116 Navajo Nation I at 905.  
117 Id. at 906-7. 
118 Id. at 906. 
119 Id. at 907. 
120 Navajo Nation II.  The panel consisted of two regular circuit judges and a Senior Judge for the Northern District 
of California, sitting by designation.   
121 Id. at 1029.  The Court reversed the summary judgment for the Forest Service with regard to one NEPA claim:  
the court stated that the environmental impact statement did not provide a thorough enough discussion of the risks 
associated with ingesting reclaimed water or, in the alternative, did not address why a more thorough discussion was 
not necessary.  Id. at 1053-4.  Though beyond the scope of this paper, there are some potentially significant issues 
with this decision related to the ability of one governmental agency to rely on the decisions of another governmental 
agency, in this case the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality’s determination about the science and safety 
of the reclaimed water.   
122 See supra, Part III.B. for a discussion of the Native religions.  
123 Navajo Nation II at 1039. 
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Hualapai healers who shared that the use of human waste, although treated, on any part of the mountain would 
contaminate all plants on the mountains and healers would be unable to replenish their medicine bundles or collect 
required water for ceremonies.124  The court also looked to the more general testimony of tribal members regarding 
the tremendous negative psychological effects of praying to a pure and holy place which they know to be 
contaminated by waters that have contained human waste and may even have passed over or through corpses; thus 
rendering their entire religious structure at risk.125  Based on this testimony, the court determined that the burden 
would be substantial, effectively destroying the foundation of the religion of at least two tribes.126 
In moving to the compelling interests, the court rejected each interest found by the District Court as too 
general and insufficient to meet the standard of the test.127  With regard to the mandate to use Forest Service land for 
multiple purposes, the court noted that the mere existence of the ski resort creates multiple uses and that the addition 
of snowmaking was unrelated to that mandate.128  The Forest Service and the owners of Snowbowl argued that the 
economic survival of the resort depended on snowmaking and that the closure of Snowbowl would eliminate the 
multiple uses required.129   The court looked to the history of Snowbowl, the annual snowfall totals over the years 
and the past expansions in light of those snowfall totals to conclude that it is too speculative to decide if Snowbowl 
would cease to exist without snowmaking.130  The court noted that, even if the closure of Snowbowl was a realistic 
possibility, there is no compelling government interest in avoiding that result.131 
The court rejected the public safety argument, stating that snowmaking simply does not advance that 
interest and that there was no evidence that skiing at the Snowbowl during the past years without snow made from 
reclaimed water was unsafe.132  Finally, the court dismissed the Establishment Clause argument by showing that the 
establishment of religion would call for the removal of the ski resort because of the already negative consequences 
to the native religions, while disallowing snowmaking only protects the religious practices while not having any 
impact on the existence or possible future of Snowbowl.133   
 Had the panel simply found that these interests were not compelling, the case would not serve as the 
example of confusion in the realm of free exercise.  But the court did not merely state that the interests were not 
compelling.  The court went beyond the compelling interest test to attempt a clarification of RFRA and how it is to 
be interpreted.  The Ninth Circuit in the Snowbowl case concluded that, though RFRA specifically states that the 
intention of Congress was to restore the compelling interest test to cases related to free exercise of religion claims,134 
RFRA is more protective of religious liberties than the First Amendment.135  The court made two basic arguments 
for the proposition that the RFRA is more protective than prior First Amendment jurisprudence.   
First, the panel looked to the scope of application to argue that the test under RFRA is not the same as the 
pre-Smith First Amendment test.  The expansion of the compelling interest test to every government action that may 
burden religion and the language of the statute seemed to the panel to be broader than the historic applications of the 
First Amendment.  The court used military regulations, welfare programs and prison regulations as examples where 
the Supreme Court and lower courts previously used less demanding tests to determine if a regulation that impacted 
religion was valid.136  The panel also pointed to the Supreme Court’s opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores137 where 
Justice Kennedy, in declaring RFRA unconstitutional as to state and local governments, stated that RFRA is broader 
                                                 
124 Id. at 1040. 
125 Id.  But see Jerry Shannon, Letter to the Editor, Snowmaking a Clash of Truth, Tradition, ARIZONA DAILY SUN, 
Mar. 19, 2007 at ___ (I have yet to learn: "What do the Indians do on the Peaks when they have to excrete human 
waste?" Do they use leather pouches or porta potties [sic] to remove the waste? Or do they simply leave the waste 
on the mountain? Although I am not a microbiology expert, I do have a chemical engineering background.  I suspect 
that more "waste" bacteria are residual from the excretion of 100 humans than from thousands of gallons of 
reclaimed wastewater.”) 
126 Navajo Nation II at 1042-3. 
127 Id. at 1045. 
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 1044-5. 
130 Id. 
131 Navajo Nation II at 1044-5.   
132 Id. at 1045-6. 
133 Id. at 1046. 
134 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(b)(1) (2000).  
135 Navajo Nation II at 1032. 
136 Id.  
137 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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than the previously used compelling interest test because it imposes the least restrictive means analysis in every 
circumstance where religion may be burdened – something that was not done in pre-Smith cases.138   
The second argument of the panel to support a broad interpretation of RFRA pertained to the language of 
the statute.  According to the court, the use of the term “burden religion” instead of the First Amendment language 
of “prohibiting the free exercise thereof” in the statute indicates a difference in meaning.139  Thus, Congress meant 
to not only restore the test that the Supreme Court had purportedly used in prior cases, it meant to change that test to 
create a greater challenge for the government when enacting any legislation or regulation that would have an impact 
on the religious practices of some person or people.  This statement is consistent with prior statements made by the 
Ninth Circuit with regard to RFRA; within three years of the passage of RFRA, and even before the amendments of 
RLUIPA, the Ninth Circuit noted that RFRA’s language mandates a different analysis than the language of the First 
Amendment.140  In 1996, the court stated that the “statute goes beyond the constitutional language that forbids the 
‘prohibiting’ of the free exercise of religion and uses the broader verb ‘burden.’”141  In this opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit adopted a new definition of burden, stating that it “must prevent the plaintiff ‘from engaging in [religious] 
conduct or having a religious experience.’”142   
In addition to the definition of the term burden, the panel noted that the Congress intended for the definition 
of “exercise of religion” to be broader than the Supreme Court had previously defined it because Congress amended 
RFRA in 2000 to redefine specifically that term.143  In RFRA, the term “exercise of religion” is defined by reference 
to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).144  The RLUIPA defines exercise of 
religion as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,”145 a 
definition not found in prior Supreme Court First Amendment cases.   
 On May 28, 2007, the United States Forest Service and the owners of the Snowbowl filed a petition for 
rehearing with the Ninth Circuit.146   
  3.  The Continuing Saga:  en banc at the 9th Circuit 
 On October 17, the Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc. On December 11, 2007, arguments 
were heard for approximately 1 hour before a panel of Ninth Circuit judges.147   During the hearing, it was clear that 
the judges were struggling with the definitions and scope of RFRA.  Chief Judge Kozinski questioned one of the 
tribe’s attorneys regarding the scope of RFRA and the textual basis for expansion beyond pre-Smith doctrine.148  
Another panel judge questioned how far RFRA could expand prior First Amendment jurisprudence without facing 
an Establishment Clause violation.149  One judge questioned whether a broad interpretation of RFRA would create 
some “categorical exclusion” of the ability of the government to control and use government lands.150  Discussion 
with counsel from all parties moved to the terminology in the statute, specifically the term “substantial burden.”151  
Specifically, one judge asked for a unified definition of “substantial burden” from the tribes and individuals who 
brought suit.152  The term “compelling government interest” also came in to the debate as one judge asked why the 
                                                 
138 Id. at 535.   
139 Id. 
140 U.S. v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1558 (9th. Cir, 1996). 
141 Id.   
142 Navajo Nation II at 1042 (quoting Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir., 1995).  
143 Navajo Nation II at 1033.   
144 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-2(4) refers to U.S.C. §2000cc-5.   
145 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000). 
146 See Cyndy Cole, Snowbowl Owner Vows to Pursue Snowmaking, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, March 13, 2007, at A-1.  
See also, Howard Fischer, Snowbowl Fight Rages On, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, March 13, 2007, at A-1 and Cyndy Cole, 
Denial of Snowmaking Appealed, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, May 31, 2007, at A-1.   
147 This panel included Chef Judge Alex Kozinski and Judges O’Scannlain, Rymer, Thomas, McKeown, Wardlaw, 
Fisher, Gould, Paez, Callahan, and N.R. Smith.  The hearing is available online at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ 
(follow :Audio Files hyperlink and enter 06-15371EB as the case number) (hereafter En Banc Oral Arguments).   
148 En Banc Oral Arguments. 
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id.   
152 Id.   
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management of the government’s own land by the government simply would not be a compelling interest.153  At the 
time of this writing, no opinion has issued from that panel.   
In the meantime, the owners of the Snowbowl Ski Resort have not begun any of the upgrades that were not 
directly affected by the earlier opinions.154  The owners stated that the delay is a result of the cost of litigation as 
well as their own desire to minimize contention and protest until the legal proceedings have been thoroughly 
completed.155  
IV. CORRECTING THE COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION TO LAW 
 The snow-making case is a clear example of the confusion that has been created by the Smith decision and 
the enactment of RFRA in response to it.  It appears that the Supreme Court could approach the confusion created by 
answering either one or three key questions should it accept the inevitable petition for a writ of certiorari.  The first 
is the constitutionality of RFRA.  The second and third, if RFRA is constitutional, address the two arguments made 
by the Ninth Circuit panel:  a determination of the scope of RFRA and clarification of the definitions of the terms of 
RFRA.  Based on current case law, it appears the Court will address all three.  An analysis of how the Court is likely 
to answer those questions is addressed below.   
 Alternatively, the Court could, and should, take a broader approach to the issue.  The Court should push the 
government to be more transparent about the authority under which it portends to act and in the process, should put 
religion back in its proper place as a key civil liberty, important enough for mention in our First Amendment.  To do 
so, the Court should eliminate RFRA through overturning Smith or by declaring it unconstitutional, should correct 
the misinterpretation of the First Amendment as set forth in the majority opinion of Smith and should send a 
message to Congress and other governmental units that they are bodies of limited power and must justify their own 
actions by reference to specific grants of power.   
 
A.  The Easy Fix 
1. The Constitutionality of RFRA 
 Based on their statements in previous cases, it is likely that the Supreme Court would finally declare RFRA 
constitutional as to the federal government in this case.156   
2. The Scope of RFRA 
 A more difficult question for the Supreme Court to answer pertains to the first of the two basic arguments 
made by the original Ninth Circuit panel.157  When reviewing RFRA and its parallel statute RLUIPA, one finds 
inconsistency in whether the statutes mandate that courts use the exact analysis of religion cases that existed prior to 
the Smith decision or if the statute goes beyond that and broadens the protection of religion.   
The legislative history of RFRA is clear that the intent of Congress was to reverse the effect of the Smith 
decision.158  Representative Brooks of Texas stated that RFRA “will restore the standard for addressing claims under 
the free exercise clause of the first amendment as it was prior to the Supreme Court’s Smith decision in 1990.”159  
Representative Hyde, of Illinois, spoke for RFRA stating that it “will overturn the 1990 decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Employment Division versus Smith.”160  Now Speaker Pelosi, then a California Representative, 
stated that “it is necessary to return the criteria for abridging religious freedom to pre-Smith days.”161  The 
committee report to the full U.S. Senate declared that RFRA was “intended to restore the compelling interest test 
                                                 
153 Id.  Other topics of discussion related to the ability of the Forest Service to rely on the Arizona Department of 
Environmental Quality’s determination of the safety of the water.  Id.    
154 Cyndy Cole, Denial of Snowmaking Appealed, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, May 31, 2007, at A-1.   
155  Id.  
156 See Part II.D. for a discussion of the prior Supreme Court cases mentioning RFRA.  
157 See, supra text accompanying notes 135-145.  
158 See, e.g. 139 CONG. REC. E1243-03 (1993) (statement of Rep. Franks); 139 CONG. REC. E1234-01 (1993) 
(statement of Rep. Cardin); 139 CONG. REC. H2356-03 (1993) (statement of Rep. Brooks); 139 CONG. REC. H2356-
03 (1993) (statement of Rep. Tucker); S.REP. 103-111, at 1898 (1993); H.R. REP. 103-88 (1993).   
159 139 CONG. REC. H2356-03 (1993) (statement of Rep. Brooks). 
160 139 CONG. REC. H2356-03 (1993) (statement of Rep. Hyde). 
161 139 CONG. REC. H2356-03 (1993) (statement of Rep. Pelosi). 
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previously applicable to free exercise cases.”162  Never in the available legislative history did a Senator or 
Representative argue that RFRA should be passed because it increased the protections to religion.  
Nowhere in the legislative history is there any discussion of the exceptions that were made in First 
Amendment jurisprudence prior to Smith.  For example, just 2 years prior to the Smith opinion, Justice O’Connor 
refused to apply the compelling interest test where Native American tribes brought a First Amendment claim stating 
that the government violated their free exercise rights by putting a highway through sacred lands, thus destroying the 
sacred nature of the lands.163  Justice O’Connor relied on an exception related to the conduct of the “Government’s 
internal procedures” to state that the land at issue was federal land and that individuals do not have the right to 
extract behavior from the government.164  In theory, under RFRA, the Court would have to analyze Lyng using the 
compelling interest test, a very different analysis than was used, with quite possibly a different result.  In fact, 
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun noted in dissent that the majority did “not for a moment suggest that the 
interests served by the . . . road are in any way compelling, or that they outweigh the destructive effect construction 
of the road will have on the [tribe’s] religious practices.”165    
A broad interpretation of the scope of RFRA, similar to the original Ninth Circuit panel, could result in more 
Establishment Clause claims if government action is tailored to the individual needs of the religions.  For example, 
if RFRA is read broadly, the tribes in the Snowbowl case could bring a new lawsuit to prohibit any and all 
expansion to the resort instead of simply the snowmaking components.   
3. The Language of RFRA   
The Supreme Court has interpreted RFRA to adopt the standard of the pre-Smith days.  In Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, the Supreme Court stated, “[RFRA] adopts a statutory rule 
comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith.”166  They further stated, “Congress’ express decision to 
legislate the compelling interest test indicates that RFRA challenges should be adjudicated in the same manner as 
constitutionally mandated applications of the test.”167  They reiterated the statutory purpose of RFRA to adopt the 
compelling interest test that had been used in Sherbert and Yoder.168    Even so, confusion as to the definitions has 
ensued in the Circuit Courts related to the terms in RFRA as well as parallel terms in RLUIPA.   
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit looked to Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine the meaning of substantial 
burden for RLUIPA and stated that a substantial burden “must impose a significantly great restriction or onus” on a 
religious exercise.169  In the Snowbowl case, the original Ninth Circuit panel adopted yet a different definition for 
RFRA, stating that a burden “must prevent the plaintiff ‘from engaging in [religious] conduct or having a religious 
experience.’”170  Thus for two statutes with similar language, the Ninth Circuit has different definitions to follow.   
In interpreting RLUIPA, the Fifth Circuit quoted the legislative history to conclude that the term 
“substantial burden” should be interpreted under the Supreme Court’s prior jurisprudence.171  In reviewing prior 
cases, the court stated that a substantial burden exists “if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his 
religious behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs.”172  In coming to a similar conclusion in 2007, the 
Seventh Circuit looked to the legislative history of RLUIPA, where cosponsors Senators Kennedy and Hatch 
released a joint statement explaining that RLUIPA did not define “substantial burden” precisely because it was not 
intended to create a new standard and that prior Supreme Court jurisprudence should guide courts in interpreting the 
statute.173  In its final determination, the Seventh Circuit adopted a very different definition, stating that a substantial 
                                                 
162 S. REP. 103-111at 1898 (1993). 
163 Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).  Interestingly, Justice O’Connor 
wrote the Lyng opinion and then dissented in Smith, the very case that resulted in the passage of RFRA and the 
potential new standard that will create a result distinctly different from the Lyng opinion. 
164 Id. at 448-453. 
165 Id. at 465.  
166 546 U.S. at 423. 
167 Id. at 430. 
168 Id. at 430-1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000).   
169 Guru Nanak Sikh v. Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006). 
170 Navajo Nation II  at 1042 (quoting Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir., 1995).  
171 Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 D.3d 559, 569 (5th Cir., 2004). 
172 Id. at 570. 
173 Vision Church v. Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir., 2007).  
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burden is one that “bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise. . . 
effectively impracticable.”174 
At a minimum, the Supreme Court needs to set forth standard definitions for the terms “substantial 
burden,” and “compelling interest” if they accept RFRA as constitutional.  The end result in the snow-making case 
will depend on the scope and definition adopted by the Court.175  Should the Court narrowly define “compelling 
interest” but broadly look at the term “burden,” the government may be forced to close down the ski resort on 
federal land.176 
 
B. The More Correct Systemic Solution   
 While addressing the three key questions above could resolve some of the problems created by Smith and 
RFRA, this case provides an opportunity to reflect on larger systemic issues.  To garner a larger and more profound 
change in the system, the Supreme Court should grant the writ of certiorari in the Snowbowl case and should 
declare RFRA unconstitutional or least render it useless as it overturns its prior Smith decision.177   
 In overturning Smith, the Court should acknowledge that the compelling interest test is the appropriate test 
for any governmental burden on religion.  In addition, the Court should give direction for the application of the key 
terms used in the compelling interest test:  substantial burden and compelling interest.  The Court also should 
recognize that many of its prior exceptions to the use of the compelling interest test were based in the fact that the 
government interest was compelling.  For example, in Smith, Justice O’Connor argued correctly that the state of 
Oregon had a compelling interest in a uniform drug law.178  In the Lyng case, the Court did not use the compelling 
interest test because the burden on religion stemmed from internal government procedures.179  Instead, the Court 
should acknowledge that the government had a compelling interest in building the road at question and for building 
the road where it was being built.180  Other exceptions can be viewed similarly.181  While this may be viewed as a 
matter of semantics, there is an important difference that could result in a systemic change should the Court send 
the right message to Congress and the other bodies.   
 The changes spurred by the decision recommended could help the legislative branch and administrative 
agencies re-focus on the limited nature of their existence.182  The Court should remind the governmental entities that 
they have limited power, and that it is the responsibility of those entities to demonstrate from where the authority to 
act comes.   
1. Focus for the Government   
 Historically, the courts have found compelling government interests during the course of litigation for a 
number of regulations that burden religion.183  The duty to enunciate the compelling government interest, however, 
                                                 
174 Id.   
175 More important than the actual result of the case is a cleaner legal environment in which to move forward.   
176 It is unclear how many other businesses would be affected by this interpretation of the Court.  See supra note 1 
for a discussion of the number and type of special use permits on federal lands.   
177 Several commentators have given significant rationale for declaring RFRA unconstitutional.  See supra note 45.  
Unfortunately the Court is not likely to overturn Smith as the only Justices still sitting on the Court from the Smith 
decision voted in the majority (Scalia, Kennedy and Stevens) and several of those who have left have been replaced 
by justices unlikely to overturn such precedent: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito and Justice Thomas. Only 
Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer may be inclined to overturn Smith. 
178 494 U.S. at 903-907. 
179 485 U.S. at 448-453.  See, supra, notes 163 and accompanying text.   
180 In Lyng, the government was building a road to connect two California towns.  485 U.S. at 442.  The Forest 
Service placed the road in a particular location to avoid soil stability problems as well as potential eminent domain 
problems.  Id.  It is unclear whether the need for the road between the two towns would be a compelling interest.    
181 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), where the Supreme Court did not apply the compelling 
interest test to a challenged military regulation prohibiting a Jew from wearing a yarmulke.  The Court exempted the 
military from the compelling interest test out of deference to the military’s role and its standing as a separate 
governmental entity, distinct from civilian society.  The Court just as easily could have stated that the uniform dress 
in the military is a compelling government interest for any number of reasons.  The key difference would be that the 
military would have to set forth those interests.   
182 See U.S. CONST. art. I, and U.S. CONST. amend X.   
183 See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.  It always amazes the author that the Court has done this so 
readily.  See Heart of Atlanta v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964), for an example of the Court finding Congressional 
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should reside with the government and should be addressed before laws are passed or regulations issued.   Congress 
and the administrative agencies are involved in thousands of different issues.184  The source of Congressional 
authority to regulate is not clear in reviewing recent bills; none of the bills gives the slightest inclination as to the 
source of power to Congress.185  Statements by the Court indicating that this responsibility lies with the regulating 
body could result in more clear legislation – perhaps fewer pieces of legislation as the governmental units reflect on 
their given limitations.  This is wholly consistent with the notion of accountability in government as well as the 
limited powers for the federal government.186  In addition and specifically to legal issues that require a compelling 
government interest, the regulating bodies should address the compelling interest in the regulation.   
 In the case of the Snowbowl, the recommended analysis would require that the Forest Service and the 
Snowbowl ski resort set forth with particularity the compelling government interest that is advanced in the least 
restrictive manner (or least burdensome manner) that would lead to the decision to allow snow-making on the Peaks 
with reclaimed water.   
2.  Specific Impact on Religion   
 The current federal paradigm for religious freedom law includes RFRA for federal actions, RLUIPA for 
any government actions covering land use or incarceration and the First Amendment for analysis of state and local 
laws or regulations.  There also are state acts that parallel RFRA that were passed after the Supreme Court decided 
City of Bourne.187  This splintered approach to free exercise analysis could lead to different results for the same 
actions depending on which government entity took the action.  For a right that was foundational enough to warrant 
inclusion in the First Amendment, this is not acceptable.  A Supreme Court decision to unify free exercise analysis 
under the First Amendment, with use of the compelling interest test, would be consistent with the desires of the 
nation, as evidenced by the strength of the vote for RFRA.  It also would create the predictability and stability 
desired of the law.   
 If the Court were to apply the compelling interest test to all free exercise cases, inevitably certain interests 
will be deemed compelling and then government action that advances those interests, in the least restrictive ways, 
will be upheld as constitutional.  One key aspect of the test that was not addressed in the snow-making case was the 
“least restrictive manner” element.188  Analyzing this factor is more objective than analyzing whether an interest is 
compelling or whether a religion is burdened.  One can do an economical cost-benefit analysis of alternatives to 
determine if the chosen activity is the least restrictive (or least burdensome) way to achieve the compelling 
government interest.  No matter what alternatives meet the “compelling interest” and “least restrictive manner” tests, 
this analysis properly would place religion back on the constitutional level.   
V. CONCLUSION 
 The Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment has undergone a number of growing pains in the history 
of our country.  As demonstrated by the Snowbowl case, religious freedom jurisprudence is complicated and 
fragmented.  The most appropriate analysis used by courts has been the compelling interest test, enunciated in the 
1960’s and used directly until 1990.  The Supreme Court has an opportunity, through the Snowbowl case, to correct 
a series of events that have done nothing but complicate free exercise jurisprudence.  The justices should take this 
opportunity to encourage Congress and the other federal units to become more accountable for the authority of their 
actions and to place religion back in its rightful sphere as a constitutionally protected civil liberty.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
authority under the Commerce Clause to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 though Congress never mentioned it, and 
quite possibly never gave it a thought.   
184 The 110th Congress had over 7200 bills before the House or Senate in 2007.  
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c110bills.html (last viewed December 21, 2007). 
185 Id.   
186 See U.S. CONST., amend X.  A cursory view of the bills before the 110th Congress indicates that none of the bills 
states any authority for Congressional regulation.  See, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c110bills.html for a list of bills 
before the 110th Congress (last viewed Dec. 21, 2007). 
187 See e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35 (found at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs.asp) and  N.M. STAT. §§28-
22-1 through 28-22-5 (1978). 
188 See Part II.B. for a discussion of the compelling interest test.   
